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Abstract 
This Research Note presents a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five 
regions. The data was collected based on the same methodology to compare patterns of 
patronage within countries, across countries and across world regions that are usually studied 
separately. The Note addresses three research questions that are at the center of debates on 
party patronage, which is understood as the power of political parties to make appointments 
to the public and semi-public sector: the scope of patronage, the underlying motivations, and 
the criteria on the basis of which appointees are selected. The exploration of the dataset 
shows that party patronage is, to a different degree, widespread across all regions. . The data 
further shows differences between policy areas, types of institutions such as government 
ministries, agencies and state-owned enterprises, and higher, middle and lower ranks of the 
bureaucracy. It is demonstrated that the political control of policy-making and 
implementation is the most common motivation for making political appointments. However, 
in countries with a large scope of patronage, appointments serve the purpose of both political 
control and rewarding supporters in exchange for votes and services. Finally, the data shows 
that parties prefer to select appointees who are characterized by political and personal loyalty 
as well as professional competence.  
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Introduction  
The exercise of political patronage within the state is an enduring phenomenon in the political 
world and has received considerable scholarly attention. Why do patronage systems emerge? 
Why does patronage differ between countries? Why is patronage a principal method of 
staffing bureaucracies in one area of the state while elsewhere the state institutions appear to 
be much stronger in resisting interference from (party) politicians? A lively scholarly debate 
exists around these questions. Some authors emphasize the role of historical legacies as the 
principal factor for the emergence and/or endurance of patronage systems (Shefter 1994; 
Piattoni 2001), others focus on the structure of party systems and political competition 
(Geddes 1994; O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007). Numerous authors emphasize 
organizational and ideological characteristics of political parties (Panebianco 1988; 
Kemahlioglu 2012; Cruz & Keefer 2015) as the key driver of patronage. There is also a rich 
literature on the politicization of the civil service, which emphasizes the impact of 
administrative traditions, public management reform, and the party change in government 
(Peters & Pierre 2004; Lewis 2008; Painter & Peters 2010; Dahlström & Niklasson 2013).  
No matter what explanations are offered by scholars, however, most literature on 
patronage politics points to the negative consequences of these practices. Contrary to 
professional bureaucracies, patronage politics is typically regarded as an obstacle to 
economic development; it promotes public sector corruption and lowers the capacity of 
agencies to manage policy programmes (Evans & Rauch 1999; Lewis 2008; Bearfield 2009; 
Dahlstroem et al. 2012; Nistotskaya & Cingolani 2015). Moreover, the literature dealing with 
these questions highlights difficulties in reforming systems in which patronage has come to 
play a large role in public service and in partisan politics (Geddes 1994; Grindle 2012). It is 
for these reasons that patronage politics has received considerable attention among policy-
makers and international organizations that seek to promote the professionalization of the 
state in transition and developing countries  (Dimitrova 2002; Andrews 2013).  
This Research Note adds to these debates by examining patterns of party patronage in 
twenty-two countries from five regions. The dataset that is presented here is based on the 
same methodology providing a unique opportunity for the comparison of countries and 
regions that are usually studied separately. The Research Note addresses three questions that 
are at the center of debates on party patronage, which we will below define as the power of 
political parties to make appointments to the public and semi-public sector. First, it examines 
the scope of party patronage, that is, the range of state institutions that is subject to political 
appointments and the extent to which patronage reach into state institutions (cf. ‘depth of 
3 
	
patronage’). Our dataset allows for the comparison of patronage across countries and regions 
as well as within countries across types of institutions, policy areas and levels in institutional 
hierarchies. The Research Note therefore presents a starting point for a more fine-grained 
understanding of patronage practices around the world.  
Second, the Research Note examines the motivation of parties and politicians for 
appointing people to positions within the state, in particular, the distinction between political 
appointments made for the sake of political ‘control’ as opposed to the ‘reward’ of political 
supporters. Our dataset hence provides an empirical assessment of assumptions from large 
parts of the comparative politics literature that refer to patronage as a form of clientelistic 
politics for the reward of supporters in exchange for political services including electoral 
support, on the one hand, and the common understandings in the comparative public 
administration literature of political appointments as a management tool for the political 
control of policy-making and implementation.  
Third, we examine in more detail the criteria that parties and politicians prioritize 
when selecting personnel for political appointments. We focus on the selection on 
professional, political and personal grounds in order to better understand whether key 
selection criteria such as professional competence and political loyalty are complementary or 
mutually exclusive.  
Our chief empirical concern is to examine these three aspects of party patronage on a 
cross-national and cross-regional basis. We also examine differences across policy domains 
and types of institutions to identify patterns of patronage across regions and countries and 
within countries. The analysis of this data yields an updated and comprehensive state of the 
art assessment in the field of party patronage in contemporary democracies. The paper begins 
with a discussion of the concept of party patronage and the methodology that was employed 
when compiling the dataset. We then present the empirical results and conclude with a 
discussion of avenues for future research.  
 
Concepts, Research Design and Methodology  
The key concept that we employ in this Research Note is that of party patronage. In contrast 
to most studies written in the tradition of particularistic politics, clientelism and corruption 
(Scott 1969; Eisenstadt & Roninger 1980), we use a relatively narrow but also more precise 
concept of party patronage, limiting the phenomenon to political appointments (Sorauf 1959; 
Wilson 1973; Kopecký et al. 2012). Unlike many other studies in the field of clientelism and 
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patronage politics, which include various personal rewards and gifts, allocation of public 
service projects, contracts or licenses, pork-barrel legislation etc. as forms of patronage, this 
research note is exclusively concerned with the ability of political parties to appoint 
individuals to (non-elective) positions in the public and semi-public sector, including posts in 
core civil service, foreign embassies, state-owned companies, quangos or regulatory agencies, 
and the practical exercise of this ability. In other words, our major empirical concern is to 
establish how far are political parties in control of the allocation of public positions.  
We therefore see party patronage as related but conceptually and empirically distinct 
from both clientelism (i.e. exchange of benefits in order to secure votes) and also from 
corruption (i.e. exchange of public decisions for private gain).1 At the same time, our 
understanding of party patronage resonates with definitions of civil service politicisation (e.g. 
Peters & Pierre 2004), in particular, those that focus on political appointments to positions 
that are nominally within the scope of the professional civil service (Lewis 2008).  
However, three caveats apply. First, party patronage in our conceptualization includes 
appointments where merit and professional qualifications – rather than only partisan and 
political criteria – may have been taken into account. Rather than excluding merit or 
professional competence by definition, we empirically investigate the criteria party 
politicians employ when making appointments. Second, party patronage in our 
conceptualization includes appointments of non-partisan individuals. Our empirical interest 
does not include only the appointments of party members but rather all appointments in 
which parties and their politicians play a meaningful role. However, the residual category of 
non-patronage appointments remains meaningful. It includes, for instance, all public 
appointments in the hands of the civil servants and various professions (doctors, judges etc.). 
The third caveat concerns the term party patronage. In practice, appointments made 
by parties and individual politicians are hard to distinguish. Most appointments within 
modern states are officially undertaken by individual politicians (usually ministers). In this 
legal sense, party patronage rarely exists. A key question therefore is the extent to which 
parties are involved in practice when ministers and other top executive politicians appoint: Is 
the party the principal and the minister the agent or vice versa? Strictly speaking, party 
patronage should imply that the mechanisms of control within parties are sufficiently strong 
for politicians, who occupy executive office in the name of the party, to merely appoint 
																																								 																				
1 For a more detailed discussion on the differences between patronage, clientelism and corruption, see Piattoni 
(2001) and Kopecký et al. (2012). 
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whoever the party proposes. Yet in presidential democracies, in particular, individual party 
politicians often appoint from within their own networks; the parties are relatively empty 
organisational shells (Scherlis 2013).2 Our survey and complementary research provides a 
tentative tool to distinguish these types of patronage politics. 
With these caveats in mind, the dataset brings together data collected in independent 
research projects in 22 countries from 2006 to 2014.3 All projects used the methodology 
based on an expert survey developed by Kopecký et al. (2012). The 22 countries cover five 
regions (see table 1). This allows us to engage in a broader comparative analysis of party 
patronage.  
 
Table 1: Countries Included in the Dataset (with year of data collection) 
Regions Western 
Europe 
Eastern 
Europe 
Southern 
Europe  
Latin America  Africa 
Countries Austria 
(2008-10) 
Denmark 
(2009) 
Germany 
(2008-10) 
Iceland 
(2008) 
Ireland 
(2009) 
Netherlands 
(2009-10) 
Norway 
(2009-10) 
UK (2009) 
Bulgaria 
(2007) 
Czech 
Republic 
(2007) 
Hungary 
(2008-9) 
Romania 
(2012-3) 
 
Greece 
(2009) 
Italy 
(2008) 
Portugal 
(2008-9) 
Spain  
(2008-9) 
Argentina              
(2007-08) 
Dominican 
Republic (2013) 
Paraguay (2012) 
Uruguay (2014) 
Ghana 
(2007) 
South Africa 
(2006) 
  
The survey comprised 947 experts; these were sampled through snowballing from, 
principally, six groups: academia, the non-governmental sector, donors, media, bureaucracy, 
political appointees and politicians. Experts were chosen for their knowledge of patronage in 
nine policy areas in each country: the judiciary, economy, finance, foreign service, 
																																								 																				
2 This applies especially to contemporary Argentina and many other presidential systems in Latin America. 
However, it is recognised that parties have relatively more organizational resources in some presidential systems 
such as Chile. 
3	The data can be obtained by sending a request to any one of the authors.		
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healthcare, culture and education, military and police, media and regional government.4 
Following Peters (1988), these nine areas were selected to cover a generic model of the state.  
The data provides patronage estimates for 179 policy areas in 22 countries.  Each 
policy area was further divided into three types of institutions: ministries, NDACs (non-
departmental agencies and commissions) and executing institutions (policy delivering and 
commercial institutions, such as state-owned enterprises or embassies). In each country, 
research teams utilized a common protocol to draw up a list of institutions falling under these 
policy areas and institutional types.  
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with experts then provided quantitative 
estimates and qualitative accounts of patronage. The interview protocol introduced and 
defined the phenomenon studied, presented quantifiable response options and permitted a 
qualitative discussion of the meaning and interpretation of each category to enhance 
measurement validity. Responses on closed-end questions were subsequently coded for use in 
SPSS format.  
Three common patronage indicators were estimated. The first – the Index of Party 
Patronage (IPP) – was calculated by multiplying the median values for coded expert 
estimates of the range and depth of patronage in each of the nine policy areas and three 
institutional types. Range and depth of patronage were measured in separate questions. 
Whether respondents believed party appointments happened in some (score=1), most (2) or 
all (3) institutions in the institutional arena and policy area yielded the patronage range 
estimate; whether respondents believed party appointments happen on the top managerial 
level (1), middle level (2), or lowest level (3) yielded the patronage depth estimate. Because 
of the ordinal nature of the data, the median score as a measure of central tendency was used 
(Healy 1999:78).  
The IPP was subsequently aggregated to produce policy area and country estimates, 
standardized from 0 (no party politicization of the state) to 1 (full party politicization). To 
facilitate interpretation of the Index, note that a value of 0.65 implies that parties appoint in 
most institutions at all levels of the administration; a value of 0.4 that parties appoint in most 
institutions at top and middle levels; and a value of 0.1 that parties appoint in a limited 
number of institutions at only the top level.  
																																								 																				
4 Depending on the territorial structure of the state, the regional government category included the state level, 
provincial level or regional level of public administration in the countries under study. It did not include the 
local government level. 
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 The second indicator measures parties’ motivations for appointments. Following the 
question ‘Why do parties appoint’?, it reports the proportion of respondents opting for one of 
three answers: ‘reward to members and activists’, ‘control of various aspects of the policy-
making process and institutions’, or ‘a combination of both reward and control’.5 These 
answers were coded for each policy area within countries.  
The third indicator captures the criteria prioritized by parties when appointing, thus 
illuminating the characteristics of appointees. It does so by reporting the proportion of 
respondents mentioning any of three criteria as explanations for being appointed to a state 
position: professional background, political allegiance, personal connections or other criteria 
deemed relevant.6 Respondents could further opt for one or several selection criteria allowing 
for the possibility that both political and professional considerations influence appointments. 
These three indicators improve upon existing studies in several ways. While precisely 
measuring patronage as a phenomenon of covert politics is elusive (Müller 2000), the 
indicators broaden the scope of patronage measurement by including ministries, agencies and 
executing institutions alike, rather than only one type of state institution. Contrary to other 
cross-country expert surveys (Dahlberg et al. 2013; Kitschelt 2014), they also go beyond 
country-level data. This adds validity, as it takes into account within-country variation of 
patronage across policy areas and institutions. In addition, an expert survey, such as the one 
presented here, does not suffer from the validity limitations of proxy indicators – such as 
personnel expenditures and state employment trajectories – employed elsewhere (Calvo & 
Murillo 2004; O'Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007; Remmer 2007). These indicators are 
often influenced by factors beyond the ability and likelihood of parties to appoint and may 
thus not reflect patronage practices (Kopecký et al. 2012).  
The expert survey also took an important duty of care to mitigate bias: at least four 
experts were surveyed in each policy area; and, on average, roughly 43 semi-structured 
expert interviews were conducted per country. Local research teams conducted all interviews 
in person and provided further validation through contextual knowledge. Reliability tests 
were conducted on parts of the data and indicated high consistency of the estimates. Potential 
problems notwithstanding, we have no reason to doubt the reliability of our measures.  
																																								 																				
5 The full text of the question reads: “In your opinion, why do political parties actually appoint people to these 
jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and members with state jobs or do they want to 
control these sectors and institutions by having personnel linked to the party appointed in them?”  
6 The full text of the question reads: “Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed by 
political parties to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten their jobs because they are 
professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal allegiance, or 
any other allegiance? 
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Confidence in the validity of our estimates as approximations of patronage is thus enhanced. 
Lastly, rather than basing inferences on assumptions about motivations and uses of party 
patronage, the survey examines them empirically. 
 
Patterns of Party Patronage in Contemporary Democracies 
The Index of Party Patronage (IPP) 
According to the expert survey, patronage is anything but a phenomenon of the past. With an 
average IPP score of 0.43, parties appoint at top- and mid-levels in most state institutions in 
the countries in the dataset. The 22 countries thereby differ starkly in the prevalence of 
patronage, with IPP values from 0.09 in the United Kingdom to 0.98 in the Dominican 
Republic (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by Country 
 
The scope of party patronage varies not only across countries, but also across types of 
institutions – albeit less so. The standard deviation of patronage scopes across institutional 
types is roughly a third of cross-country deviation. When comparing the IPP across types of 
institutions, ministries are found to register by far the highest patronage scope (0.54). NDACs 
and Executing Institutions score substantially lower, at 0.39 and 0.36 respectively (figure 2).7 
The greater politicization of ministries holds across all regions covered in the survey: 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Africa and Latin America.  
																																								 																				
7 Note that the data does not differentiate between NDACs and Executing Institutions in the cases of Uruguay, 
Paraguay and the Dominican Republic. The conclusions are not affected by this conflation. 
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Figure 2: Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by Institutional Type 
 
 
Party patronage also varies across policy areas – albeit with only roughly 58 per cent of the 
standard deviation of institutional types (figure 3).8 Scholarly works examining intra-country 
variation in state politicization would thus do well to give greater prominence to types of 
institutions – rather than solely cross-sector variation (Gingerich 2013). Across policy areas, 
Media (0.43) registers the highest average patronage scope. That parties prioritize political 
control of public media may not surprise given its potential centrality for re-election. 
Economy and Health also come out with relatively higher patronage scores. We could argue 
that health policy and economic policies such as industrial policy and privatisation are high-
risk areas for corruption and hence also with particular appeal for party patronage. By 
contrast, Finance (0.32), Education and Culture (0.32), and Military and Police (0.33) score 
lowest. This finding is congruent with scholarly works pointing to, first, incentives to 
depoliticize public finances given its centrality in macroeconomic performance; and, second, 
the role of professional groups – such as teachers and policemen – as constituencies for 
depoliticization (Leonard 2010; Grindle 2012; Meyer-Sahling & Jager 2012).  
 
Figure 3. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by Policy Area 
																																								 																				
8 Figure 3 only includes countries with data for the eight policy areas included in the figure. Germany, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and the Dominican Republic are thus excluded. 
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Figure 4 shows that party patronage also varies across regions.9 Exploring such 
regional variation is insightful not least to examine the extent to which regional historical, 
political, legal and cultural commonalities shape patronage patterns. The five regions covered 
in the survey differ in legacies of pertinence for patronage, from patrimonalism and 
corporatism in Latin America to British colonial institutions in parts of Africa, communist 
state legacies in Eastern Europe, long-standing Weberian bureaucracies in Western Europe 
and clientelist democratic legacies in Southern Europe, to name a few (see, among many, 
Fukuyama 2014). The dataset may, of course, not claim representativeness for all regions. 
While European regions are well-covered, only four countries are sampled in Latin America. 
More problematically, in Africa, the two countries included – Ghana and South Africa – 
share a British colonial legacy and relatively successful democratization episodes. These 
attributes may make for less politicization than in the remainder of Africa. This should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the data.  
 
Figure 4. Index of Party Patronage (IPP) by Region 
 
																																								 																				
9 The regional classification is but one of many potential country classifications. For space limitations, others 
are not explored. Other scholars may utilize the data to examine other analytically pertinent country 
classifications, such as by waves of democratization, income or human development. 
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With this caveat in mind, the scope of patronage varies between 0.27 (Western Europe) and 
0.81 (Latin America) across regions. Eastern Europe (0.42), Southern Europe (0.45) and 
Africa (0.40) score roughly around the dataset average. Western European countries occupy 
the five lowest positions in the IPP, while Latin American countries occupy four of the five 
highest ranks.  
On average, patronage is restricted to the highest levels of state institutions in Western 
Europe, while it permeates all levels of the hierarchy in the large majority of state institutions 
in Latin America. This confirms evidence from qualitative studies pointing to high state 
politicization in Latin America, and relatively low politicization in Western Europe (Page & 
Wright 1999; Peters & Pierre 2004; Grindle 2012).  
These patterns are insightful not least for scholars studying the determinants of 
patronage. To illustrate this assertion, consider congruence of these patterns with just two – 
of many hypothesized – key determinants: economic development and regional legacies. In 
regards to the former, the cross-country data suggests that accounting for politicization solely 
through variation in economic development is not warranted (e.g. Kitschelt & Kselman 2013 
for a corresponding critique). Uruguay – with the least patronage in Latin America in the 
dataset – is more politicized than Romania (0.48) and Ghana (0.4), the countries with the 
most patronage in Eastern Europe and Africa respectively. Yet, Uruguay’s GNI per capita is 
68 per cent higher than Romania’s and more than 8.5 times higher than Ghana’s (World Bank 
2015). 
Differential regional legacies appear more plausible at first sight. The standard 
deviation of patronage across regions is twice that of patronage within regions. Yet region-
specific legacies by no means predetermine the scope of patronage. Significant intra-regional 
differences remain. To illustrate, patronage scopes range from 0.6 (Uruguay) to 0.98 
(Dominican Republic) in Latin America; from 0.29 (Portugal) to 0.62 (Greece) in Southern 
Europe; and from 0.09 (UK) to 0.49 (Austria) in Western Europe. Regional legacies thus do 
not suffice to explain patronage patterns, either. Instead, multiple concurrent causes are likely 
to produce the observed variation in party patronage.   
 
Motivations for Party Patronage  
As aforementioned, two different motivations of (party) politicians to appoint within the state 
are distinguished: a desire to control state institutions, for example in order to ensure 
formulation and implementation of policies compatible with politician’s aims; and a desire to 
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reward party or politician’s supporters, activists or even friends and family, for example for 
their electoral support or for their loyal service to the party. The distinction between different 
motivations for patronage appointments is not only interesting in itself, but also underscores 
two rather different general patterns of patronage politics: one which is clientelistic in nature 
and where public jobs are used on a large scale as currency for purchasing votes, mobilizing 
grass-root activism and establishing loyal clienteles (Piattoni 2001; Kitschelt & Wilkinson 
2006; Stokes et al. 2013); and one which is non-clientelistic and where public jobs are used 
as a resource to exert control over, and establish presence within the state (Bearfield 2009; 
Jalali & Lisi 2009; Kopecký et al. 2012).  
As aforementioned, the expert survey sought estimates on whether parties were 
motivated by “control,” “reward,” “both” or “other motivations” when appointing. The 
implication from the data is clear: across the 22 countries, patronage serves either solely 
purposes of control of state institutions (43%), or both control and reward for political 
support (41%) (figure 5). This suggests that parties use patronage either principally as a 
resource to control the state through networks of political appointees in state institutions, or 
as a control and electoral resource – yet rarely solely as an electoral resource.10 Studies 
equating patronage solely with ‘jobs for votes’ are thus misguided. 
 
Figure 5. Party Motivations (Average across Countries) 
 
 
This conclusion holds across regions. In no region or country is the traditional clientelist 
conception of patronage as reward the most important category, although it is higher in Latin 
America (11%) than elsewhere. Patronage motivations across regions vary principally in 
regards to whether ‘control’ or ‘control and reward’ are dominant. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
patronage is principally motivated by control in Western Europe. In Latin America, Southern 
																																								 																				
10 Note, however, that, for our interviewees, “control of state institutions” meant slightly different things. 
Meanings ranged from control of policy-making and implementation to control of political content/media 
coverage and control over possibilities for building clientelistic and corrupt networks in the state. Yet these 
different interpretations all stress the benefit patronage appointments bring to the appointing agent – the party – 
as opposed to the appointee, which is captured by the reward motivation. 
8% 
43% 41% 
8% 
0% 
50% 
100% 
Reward Control Both Other 
13 
	
Europe and Eastern Europe, in contrast, patronage serves as both a control and an electoral 
resource (figure 6).11  
 
Figure 6. Motivations of Party Patronage by Region 
 
 
Characteristics of Patronage Appointees  
Party patronage varies not only in scope and motivations, but also in the characteristics of 
appointees. To explore this variation, the expert survey inquired about the criteria prioritized 
by parties when appointing: professionalism, political allegiance or personal connections 
(figure 7). On average, professionalism is the most important criterion for selecting 
appointees in the 22 countries sampled (84%). This is followed by political allegiance (70%) 
and personal connections (62%). Prima facie, this is welcome news: if professionalism of 
appointees takes centre stage, the effect of patronage on organizational performance in state 
bureaucracies is likely to be less pernicious (cf. Gallo & Lewis 2012). The relatively high 
proportions for all three criteria, however, imply that parties typically prioritize multiple 
criteria when appointing to the state. Party politicians thus frequently select appointees who 
are, concurrently, professionally competent, loyal to the party and personally connected to an 
individual in the party.  
 
Figure 7. Qualifications of Appointees (Average across Countries) 
 
																																								 																				
11 In Africa, control is the dominant motivation. As aforementioned, this may, however, be an artefact of case 
selection. 
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Moreover, the characteristics of appointees differ markedly across regions. Professionalism 
trumps in Western and Southern Europe; political allegiance is central in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America; and personal allegiance is prioritized in the two African countries (Figure 8). 
With this in mind, the next section will explore associations between the three distinct 
patronage dimensions in the dataset. 
 
Figure 8. Qualifications of Appointees by Region 
 
 
From Jobs-for-Votes to Democratic Responsiveness? Patronage Prevalence and the 
Nature of Patronage 
 
To complement the analysis of patronage patterns, we examine associations between 
patronage scopes, motivations and appointee qualifications. To our knowledge, this analysis 
is a first in the literature. It sheds light on the extent to which the nature of patronage – its 
motivations and the characteristics of appointees – evolves with changes in the extent of 
patronage. Such an evolution is deductively intuitive. With a lower patronage scope, the 
capacity of parties to appoint is curtailed. Control could then become more central: parties 
need to ensure a responsive state apparatus with fewer appointees. Concurrently, reward may 
become less valuable: elections are less likely to be won with (fewer available) jobs-for-votes 
offers. With control-motivated patronage taking center stage, we may expect parties to seek 
more professional appointees. Controlling state institutions is likely to require more 
professional competence than electoral campaign support.  
If these expectations are true, we might expect that the more limited the patronage 
scope, the more patronage would revolve around assuring the democratic responsiveness of 
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bureaucracy through professionally-qualified appointees rather than the clientelist 
mobilization of votes through appointments of party members.  
This analysis indicates that the expected relations are common but several exceptions 
are noteworthy. The first hypothesized association – between patronage scope and 
motivations – is the most tenuous one. Countries are, as noted, split in regards to whether 
control or control and reward is the principal patronage motivation. Per our expectation, 
patronage scopes are negatively associated with ‘control’ (r = -0.20) and positively with 
‘control and reward’ (r = 0.45). Control is the dominant motivation in only one country with 
high patronage (Argentina); and not the dominant motivation in only one country with low 
patronage (Portugal) (table 2). A negative association between patronage scope and control-
motivated patronage thus exists, yet is not deterministic. This is unsurprising. As in 
Argentina’s central government, patronage may be extensive where it serves to secure state 
control in contexts of weak formal control mechanisms and limited incumbent trust towards 
public employees appointed by predecessors, for instance (Scherlis 2013). 
		
Table 2. Patronage Scope and Motivations: Country Classification 
 
Scope 
Principal Motivation 
Low 
(0 – 0.29) 
Medium 
(0.3 – 0.6) 
High 
(0.61-1) 
Control  Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Norway 
Ghana, South Africa, 
Germany, Austria, 
Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Uruguay 
Argentina 
 
Control & Reward  Portugal Iceland, Ireland, Spain, 
Romania, Bulgaria12 
Greece, Paraguay, 
Dominican Republic 
 
 
As expected, control is also associated with more professional appointees: professionalism 
trumps where patronage is principally motivated by control (table 3). Vice versa, however, 
professionalism also trumps in three countries – Iceland, Italy and the Netherlands – in which 
patronage is principally motivated by control and reward (Kopecký et al. 2012). While more 
‘control and reward’ (rather than solely control) motivated patronage is thus negatively 
associated with professionalism (r = -0.49); and positively associated with political allegiance 
(r = 0.45), this association is, once again, not deterministic.  
																																								 																				
12 Control and Control and Reward are equally important in Bulgaria.  
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Table 3. Patronage Motivations and Appointee Qualifications: Country Classification 
Qualifications 
Principal Motivation 
Professional (>=0.7) Professional & political 
allegiance (>=0.7) 
Political allegiance 
(>=0.7) 
Control  United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Norway, 
South Africa, Ghana 
Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Argentina, Germany, 
Austria 
 
Control & Reward  Iceland, Italy, 
Netherlands 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, 
Greece 
Bulgaria, Romania 
Paraguay, 
Dominican 
Republic 
 
 
In accordance with our theoretical expectations, appointees are also less professional (r = -
0.54) and more politically allegiant (r = 0.52) where the scope of patronage is greater. 
Outliers are less present in this association. Where the scope of patronage is limited, 
professionalism trumps; where patronage is pervasive, political allegiance takes center stage 
(table 4). Patronage thus prioritizes professionalism where it is limited, and political 
allegiance where it is extensive.  
	
Table 4. Patronage Scope and the Qualifications of Appointees: Country Classification 
Scope 
Qualifications 
Low 
(0 – 0.3) 
Medium 
(0.31 – 0.6) 
High 
(0.61-1) 
Professional (>=0.7) Denmark, United 
Kingdom, Norway, 
Netherlands 
Iceland, Ghana, South 
Africa, Italy 
 
Professional & 
political allegiance 
(>=0.7) 
Portugal Germany, Spain, 
Austria, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, 
Ireland 
Greece, Argentina 
Political allegiance 
(>=0.7)  
 Bulgaria, Romania Paraguay, Dominican 
Republic 
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The nature of patronage thus tends to evolve with its scope. Where patronage is 
extensive, it prioritizes political allegiance of appointees and is motivated by control of state 
institutions and reward for political support. In other words, it serves parties as a resource to 
gain electoral support and control the state through the embedment of a   network of party 
political appointees. In contrast, where patronage is limited, it typically revolves around 
control of state institutions through professional appointees. Outliers exist, however, as 
exemplified by Argentina and Portugal. While the scope, motivation and focus of appointee 
qualifications therefore tend to be closely related, the exceptions indicate that the relation 
between dimensions of patronage remains an empirical question worthy of exploration. 
 
Conclusion 
This Research Note has presented a new dataset of party patronage in 22 countries from five 
regions. The data was collected based on the same methodology and provides a unique 
opportunity to compare patterns of patronage across countries and regions that are typically 
studied separately.  
The exploration of the dataset has shown that party patronage is widespread across all 
regions including Western Europe. Regional differences are evident. Especially Latin 
America stands out with a higher scope of party patronage. The data further shows that 
patronage is particularly relevant for central government ministries, which are located closer 
to the centres of political power. Agencies and other non-ministerial bodies as well as 
executing institutions such as state-owned enterprises, hospitals, universities and the police 
are relatively less exposed to political appointments. This pattern has been shown to be 
consistent across all five regions covered in the Research Note.  
There is also considerable evidence that patronage is more common in the higher 
ranks of the bureaucracy. The middle and lower ranks are mainly subject to political 
appointments in countries with a high scope of patronage, indicating that patronage creeps 
down institutional hierarchies rather than upwards.  
Our data has further indicated that the control of policy-making and implementation is 
the most common motivation for making political appointments. This appears to be 
especially true for the low patronage cases of Western Europe. By contrast, in countries with 
a large scope of patronage, appointments serve both a control and a reward function. Our data 
hence indicates that the clientelistic understanding of party patronage as an electoral resource 
remains important. However, the data suggests that it is unusual to find settings in which 
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appointments are exclusively made for the sake of rewarding party affiliates in exchange for 
political services and support.  
Finally, the exploration of the dataset showed consistently that parties prefer to 
appoint, on average, politically and personally loyal professionals. In other words, it is 
problematic to assume a simple dichotomy between political and professional appointments, 
as politicians appear to be interested in both professional competence and political loyalty. 
The extent to which different selection criteria are applied does however remain an empirical 
question.  
The main purpose of this Research Note has been the presentation of a cross-regional 
dataset on patterns of party patronage; the first of its kind. Yet the data provides a number of 
opportunities for further research. First, the cross-regional dataset increases the number of 
observations at the country level. It further increases the variation in the scope of patronage 
and for the study of other dimensions of patronage captured by the dataset.  
Second, the cross-regional dataset yields new opportunities for the explanation of 
patronage politics. For instance, a cross-regional perspective allows for a comprehensive 
assessment of the impact of parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential regimes on 
party patronage, which is not possible in research that focuses on one region only. Similarly, 
governance in Latin America, Africa and the European regions is subject to very different 
forms of international influence that will allow for a better understanding of party patronage.   
Third, while cross-regional differences were evident, the exploration of the dataset 
has confirmed the importance of intra-regional variation in patronage politics. This suggests 
that determinants well known from the literature such as administrative traditions, the 
structure of political competition, the type of political parties – to name but a few prominent 
ones – are indeed essential for the explanation of variation in party patronage.  
Finally, the dataset provides new avenues for the within-country analysis of 
patronage. Indeed the data points towards important differences across policy areas, types of 
institutions and organisational hierarchies. Both domestic and international factors are likely 
to be relevant here. For instance, the globalization of markets might have put pressure on 
governments to insulate, at least partially, the management of the economy and public 
finances from political interference. In the literature on the political economy of development 
in Latin America, these patterns are commonly discussed under the heading of ‘pockets of 
effectiveness’ (Leonard 2010; Bersch et al. 2013). By contrast, ‘islands of excellence’ in 
Central and Eastern Europe have been linked to the EU accession process (Goetz 2001, 
Meyer-Sahling & van Stolk 2015). A cross-regional perspective therefore opens new agendas 
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for research as much as it presents an invitation for further research on party patronage 
around the world. 
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